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In cross-sectional studies, countries with greater income inequality typically exhibit less support for
government-led redistribution and greater acceptance of wage inequality (e.g., United States versus
Western Europe). If individual nations evolve along this pattern, a vicious cycle could form with reduced
social concern amplifying primal increases in inequality due to forces like skill-biased technical change.
Exploring movements around these long-term levels, however, this study finds mixed evidence regarding
the vicious cycle hypothesis. On one hand, larger compensation differentials are accepted as inequality
grows. This growth in differentials is of a smaller magnitude than the actual increase in inequality,
but it is nonetheless positive and substantial in size. Weighing against this, growth in inequality is
met with greater support for government-led redistribution to the poor. These patterns suggest that









Accounting for the substantial increase in wage and income inequality over the last three decades
is a central theme of recent economic research. The bulk of the literature focuses on forces oper-
ating within the labor market on the supply and demand for skilled workers. These include the
slower growth rate in the supply of educated workers, the introduction of labor-saving produc-
tion and computing technologies, and capital deepening. Others researchers consider structural
changes of the labor market itself, like the decline of institutions and policies that have his-
torically compressed the wage structure (e.g., unions, minimum wages) and the proliferation of
"superstar" labor markets where top performers earn disproportionate sums to those just be-
hind them. The potential erosion of social preferences regarding compensation inequality and
redistribution is also widely discussed. For the United States, particular emphasis is placed on
the explosion in executive pay and deepening within-establishment inequality.1
While the early work considers each of these determinants in isolation, it is increasingly
clear that the interactions among the factors bear signi￿cant responsibility. Moreover, a greater
potential for the entrenchment or ampli￿cation of inequality exists in this general-equilibrium
setting.2 Taking skill-biased technical change as an example, its individual e⁄ect on inequality
will be checked in the long-run as ￿rms substitute towards cheaper factors of production or
labor supplies adjust. If the bias is su¢ cient, however, the technical change and its concomitant
increase in inequality may also prompt lasting changes in the structure of the labor market
(e.g., deunionization, increased segregation of skilled workers) that magnify its solitary e⁄ect.
Of course, interactions can alternatively dampen inequality shocks.
This potential for ampli￿cation is particularly strong for social preferences regarding income
equalization. First, if changes in inequality directly in￿ uence ideology, then social preferences
are a propagation channel for any shock to the income distribution, regardless of the source. Sec-
ond, of all the factors discussed, social attitudes are the least governed (if at all) by market-like
mechanisms that can retard excessive changes. The potential thus exists for the formation of a
"vicious cycle" where increases in disparity weaken concern for wage equality or redistribution.
This weakened concern a⁄ords greater future compensation di⁄erentials, a shrinking of the wel-
fare state, and so on that further increase inequality and again shift preferences. Alternatively,
changes in social preferences can counteract inequality increases.
Support for the vicious-cycle hypothesis can be taken from the cross-sectional distributions
1A small sample of the work on these inequality determinants includes Rosen (1981); Bok (1993); Berman,
Bound, and Griliches (1994); Frank and Cook (1995); Katz and Murphy (1995); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(1996); Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998); Lee (1999); Buchinsky and Hunt (1999); Krusell et. al. (2000); Card
(2001); Card and Lemieux (2001); Acemoglu (2002); Card and DiNardo (2002); Rotemberg (2002); Clark (2003);
Piketty and Saez (2003); Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2004); Guadalupe (2007); Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2008); Lemieux (2008); Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Autor and Dorn (2011). Gordon and Dew-
Becker (2008), Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010), and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) provide recent surveys of
various inequality determinants.
2For example, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Violante (2001); Benabou (2002); Hassler et. al. (2003); and Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2011).
1of countries (particularly long-term OECD members) and regions of the United States. Nations
with greater income inequality typically demonstrate less support for redistribution and greater
acceptance of wage inequality than their more-equal counterparts. While the evolution of coun-
tries or regions along this pattern would be consistent with hypotheses of reduced social concern,
this response is not guaranteed as many primal factors determining these long-term ideology po-
sitions (e.g., beliefs regarding social mobility) may be stable.3 The empirical response of social
preferences to changes in inequality has yet to be explored systematically.
This paper investigates this question by focusing on short-term movements in inequality
and social attitudes around the long-term level of each country or United States region. A
￿xed-e⁄ect estimation strategy removes permanent di⁄erences in inequality and redistribution
philosophies, as well as common time trends. The contribution of this study is to characterize
how the resulting longitudinal responses resemble and di⁄er from the cross-sectional pattern.
How responses di⁄er by income class and neighborhood racial heterogeneity is also considered.4
A ￿rst set of international results are drawn from a panel of countries repeatedly surveyed
by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS).
Complementary results and extensions are developed through regional variation in the United
States captured by the General Social Survey (GSS). To establish causality, an instrument-
variable speci￿cation that exploits exogenous changes in the real federal minimum-wage rate
interacted with predetermined regional characteristics is also employed.
The results of this study provide mixed evidence regarding the vicious-cycle hypothesis. On
one hand, larger compensation di⁄erentials are accepted as inequality grows. This growth in
wage di⁄erentials is of a smaller magnitude than the actual increase in inequality, but it is
nonetheless positive and substantial in size. On the other hand, growth in inequality is met
with greater concern over inequality, greater support for government-led redistribution to the
poor, and greater support for more-progressive taxation. This is particularly true for inequality
in the bottom half of the income distribution. While greater class con￿ ict is perceived along
income dimensions, the increases in support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are as
strong as those of poorer individuals. These patterns suggest that short-run inequality shocks
can be reinforced in the labor market, and that changes in compensation di⁄erentials due to
changing factors of production are only modestly retarded by social preferences. By contrast,
inequality growth does not result in weaker political preferences for redistribution, suggesting
that the policy channel alone is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle that ampli￿es primal inequality
3The determinants of this cross-sectional pattern have been a frequent and lively political-economy topic since
at least de Tocqueville. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) and Glaeser (2006) o⁄er broad studies of why the
United States has both higher inequality and a smaller welfare state than Western Europe, including appropriate
references.
4Political-economy models di⁄er in their predictions of how responses to inequality changes vary by income
class. Piketty (1995) constructs a Rawlsian model where increases in the inequality of opportunity, holding
￿xed beliefs regarding the incentive costs of e⁄ort, promote greater support for redistribution independent of
current income. On the other hand, the standard median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richards 1981) suggests
increases in inequality lead to a divergence in preferences for redistribution as gaps to the median income widen.
2changes.
Before proceeding to the analysis, it is important to distinguish preferences regarding inequal-
ity from other factors that in￿ uence perceptions of distributive justice. Political economists have
long considered how beliefs regarding the determinants of success a⁄ect attitudes towards re-
distribution. Individuals and societies who believe hard work and e⁄ort are more important
for outcomes than luck or ancestry often choose systems characterized by higher inequality and
lower redistribution.5 Past mobility experiences and future expectations of social position are
also signi￿cant for attitudes towards income equalization.6 If the forces driving higher inequality
also alter these underlying beliefs, then social preferences for equality may weaken. The analy-
sis presented below controls for changes in these social-mobility beliefs to isolate the e⁄ect of
inequality, and additional research needs to evaluate whether other ampli￿cation mechanisms
operate through these channels.
Section 2 of this paper presents evidence using variations across countries in inequality lev-
els and social preferences. Section 3 then considers regional variation in the United States,
while Section 4 re￿nes the United States ￿ndings through an instrumental-variable speci￿ca-
tion combining exogenous changes in the federal minimum wage with predetermined regional
characteristics. The ￿nal section concludes.
2 Preferences in International Surveys
The international portion of this study focuses on how social attitudes towards redistribution
respond to changes in national income inequality. Evidence is drawn fromthe International Social
Survey Programme (ISSP) and the World Value Survey (WVS) using ￿xed-e⁄ects estimations
that combine repeated opinion surveys with aggregate inequality metrics. The data structure
and empirical approach are ￿rst described, followed by the estimation results and a discussion
of the results and identi￿cation.
2.1 ISSP and WVS Data Structure
The ISSP conducts annual surveys in member countries (38 nations in 1999) on rotating topics
ranging from religion to environmental protection. This study primarily considers questions
that were included in the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module. Responses to three
complementary questions proxy social preferences for government-led income redistribution, the
￿rst considering the responsibility of the government in the transfer of income (Government
5Alesina and Angeletos (2005) demonstrate how di⁄erences in these beliefs can create multiple equilibria among
otherwise similar economies, as rational agents select taxation and redistribution policies (and their associated dis-
tortions) that ful￿ll their original expectations. Benabou and Tirole (2006) develop a related general-equilibrium
model where di⁄erent beliefs regarding how just the world is create two distinct redistribution states. Guvenen,
Kuruscu, and Ozkan (2011) consider the general equilibrium of human capital investments and redistribution
policies.
6For example, Piketty (1995); Benabou and Ok (2001); Fong (2001, 2006); and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
3Responsibility), the second focusing on the progressive nature of taxation (Progressive Taxation),
and the last focusing on the acceptability of current income di⁄erences (Inequality Acceptance).
Higher responses on a ￿ve-point scale indicate greater support for government intervention,
greater support for more progressive taxation, and greater concern over income di⁄erences.
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occu-
pations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current pay
scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio is developed as
the log ratio of the wages ascribed for a "doctor in general practice" and an "unskilled worker in
a factory." A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a log ratio of zero would indi-
cate unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount), while a lower ratio indicates
less support for compensation di⁄erentials.
Finally, two questions regarding the presence of con￿ icts between social groups are considered.
The ￿rst, focusing on con￿ icts between the poor and the rich (Poor-Rich Con￿ ict), is used to
validate respondents￿awareness of the inequality in their countries, while a second question
regarding con￿ ict between young and old people is considered as a falsi￿cation exercise (Young-
Old Con￿ ict). A higher score on a four-point scale indicates a greater perception of con￿ ict.
As a complement to the ISSP, responses to a question included in the 1990, 1995, and 2000
rounds of the WVS are studied. For this question (WVS Income Equalization) respondents are
asked to rate their views regarding income equalization, with a higher score on a ten-point scale
expressing greater concern. Table 1 details the countries included, sample sizes, and average
responses to these questions for both surveys. The unpublished Data Appendix describes in
detail the wording of each question.
As a ￿nal ingredient, this study estimates changes in national income inequality using log
gini series constructed from the United Nations Development Programme￿ s World Income In-
equality Database (WIID), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Deininger and Squire (1996),
Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001), and various national statistics
agencies. With a few exceptions, these gini estimates are estimated with national samples of dis-
posable (after-transfers) household income and lagged one year. The Data Appendix documents
the international series constructed and the techniques employed.
2.2 Empirical Estimation Strategy
Figure 1 illustrates the main ￿ndings of the study. Panel 1A plots the average response by
country to the Government Responsibility question in the 1992 ISSP survey against the log
inequality level in the country. The trend line indicates that greater inequality is associated
with weaker support for redistribution. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a
doctor vs. unskilled worker. Respondents in countries with greater inequality propose a wider
wage distribution, too. These cross-sectional patterns have been frequently documented, and
both patterns could be taken as evidence that a vicious cycle could emerge with growth inequality
4prompting changes in preferences that further amplify the original increase.
The patterns evident in the cross-sections, however, do not necessarily dictate the movement
of countries over time. Panels 1C and 1D consider changes in preferences and inequality from
1992 to the 1999 ISSP survey. In Panel 1C, increased inequality is associated with greater
redistribution support, in contrast to Panel 1A. Societies experiencing increases in inequality
become more concerned about income di⁄erences and assign an increasing responsibility to
the government for transferring income. Thus, within-country shifts in policy preferences for
redistribution do not mirror cross-country patterns, perhaps because other factors that a⁄ect
redistribution preferences are not being in￿ uenced (e.g., belief about determinants of success or
mobility). Yet, Panel 1D does show that respondents propose a wider wage distribution after
increases in inequality. The within-country and across-country patterns are much more similar
with respect to preferences regarding appropriate wage dispersion.
While important for framing the analysis, the visual correlations fail to control adequately
for factors in￿ uencing both inequality and social attitudes for redistribution. First, common
shifts in attitudes over time (e.g., a greater worldwide concern for inequality not necessarily
linked to changes in the inequalities of individual countries) can a⁄ect the results. A robust
analysis should also control for changes between surveys in national income and demography
(e.g., an aging population). Finally, and most importantly, social-mobility experiences and beliefs
regarding the sources of success are primary determinants of attitudes toward redistribution. It
is important to account for changes in these experiences and perceptions to isolate the role of
increasing inequality.
To characterize how inequality changes in￿ uence social preferences, the study estimates a
series of regressions with individual responses to the surveys as dependent variables. For sim-
plicity, only least-squares speci￿cations are discussed; ordered-logit speci￿cations that allow for
non-linearities in responses yield similar results. The primary estimation equation takes the
following form (person i, country c, year t):
RESPi;c;t = ￿c + ￿t + ￿ ln(GINIc;t￿1) + ￿Nc;t￿1 + ￿Xi;c;t + ￿i;c;t; (1)
where ￿c and ￿t are vectors of country and year ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. The cross-sectional
e⁄ects ￿c control for the long-run positions of each country in terms of preferences and inequality
levels, while the year e⁄ects ￿t control for systematic changes between surveys in inequality
growth and survey responses. These panel variables focus identi￿cation on relative changes in
inequality and survey responses across countries in the sample. Regressions are weighted to form
nationally representative samples and to have each country-survey carry the same signi￿cance.
The results are robust to di⁄erent weighting strategies. Standard errors are clustered by country.
The ￿ coe¢ cient is the focus of this study. Survey responses are ordered so that a positive
￿ coe¢ cient re￿ ects a more-concerned position: greater concern for inequality, more support for
government intervention, and so on. The exception is the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker
5Wage Ratio, where a positive ￿ coe¢ cient re￿ ects a wider proposed wage di⁄erential. The
gini estimates are preferably lagged one year. The Nc;t￿1 vector of covariates includes controls
for macroeconomic conditions in each country contemporaneous with the inequality measure.
A log GDP per capita covariate controls for national wealth at the time of the survey; two
other covariates control for the share of economic activity in the country-year coming from
industry/manufacturing and from services. These factors can in￿ uence preferences for redistrib-
ution independent of inequality, and incorporating these macroeconomic controls better isolates
inequality￿ s role. Finally, the Xi;c;t vector of individual-level covariates includes personal demo-
graphics and responses to social-mobility questions as controls. These controls are discussed
further below.
2.3 International Preferences Results
Table 2 presents the international results for the ￿ coe¢ cient, with each row representing a
separate set of regressions for the ISSP or WVS dependent variable indicated. To conserve
space, only the observations for the Government Responsibility regressions are listed, but these
counts are representative for the other ISSP estimations in Panels B-F. The ￿rst column of
results is for regressions that include only country and year ￿xed e⁄ects and macroeconomic
covariates. Variables are transformed to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation to
aid in interpretation. Thus, the 0.161 coe¢ cient on the gini estimate in the ￿rst regression
for Government Responsibility indicates that a one standard-deviation growth in inequality is
partially correlated with a growth of about 16% of one standard deviation in survey responses
towards greater government-led redistribution.
This positive elasticity con￿rms the visual patterns in Panel 1C of Figure 1, and support for
a more-progressive tax structure is also evident in Panel B. Panel G also ￿nds a similar call for
greater income equalization in the WVS sample. These partial correlations are statistically sig-
ni￿cant and of moderate economic magnitudes. Taking the United States as a speci￿c example,
the implied increase in redistribution preferences from a standard-deviation inequality growth
would close the gap to the average responses of other Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g., Canada, Aus-
tralia, and Great Britain), but would fall short of the levels of continental Europe and especially
transition economies. The short-run responses thus re￿ ect modest movements around the long-
term levels of the countries. Nevertheless, their positive direction suggests an inequality shock
alone is insu¢ cient to start a cycle of deteriorating support for redistribution policies.7
Potential omitted variable biases are a clear concern for these ￿rst two outcomes. It is possible
that the inequality metric is simply correlated with unmodeled factors that are truly responsible
7Levels regressions without country ￿xed e⁄ects also con￿rm the cross-section correlations evident in Panel
1A of Figure 1. Nations with greater inequality have a signi￿cantly reduced concern for income di⁄erences,
weaker support for government intervention, and lower desire for a progressive tax structure. While critical for
the results, panel estimations of inequality dynamics are rarely employed (e.g., Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch
2004).
6for the higher support for government-led redistribution. The next three rows, however, provide
reassurance that concern over inequality truly underlies the support for stronger government
intervention. The increase in inequality is associated with greater concern for income di⁄erences
in Panel C and greater awareness of social con￿ ict between poor and rich in Panel D. As a com-
parison, Panel E ￿nds inequality changes are not correlated with changes in awareness of social
con￿ ict between young and old people. These outcomes are consistent with inequality growth
raising concerns about disparities and prompting greater support for government redistribution.
Panel F demonstrates, however, that respondents are more likely to propose a wider wage
distribution with higher inequality. A one standard-deviation growth in inequality is associated
with a 0.25 standard deviation increase in proposed wage di⁄erentials. An unreported disag-
gregation of changes in the Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio ￿nds the expansion
to be primarily occurring between doctors and skilled workers rather than skilled workers and
unskilled workers. A similar elasticity is evident for the proposed wage di⁄erential between the
chairman of a large, national company and an unskilled worker. This growth in proposed wage
di⁄erentials￿ based upon what respondents think occupations should earn￿ indicates at least
partial acceptance of inequality shifts due to changes in relative factor scarcities and associated
rewards. The coe¢ cient of 0.25 is statistically di⁄erent from zero, a level where no support for
a wider distribution is evident, and from a value of one, a level where a full endorsement of the
inequality expansion is evident if the inequality increase is due to growing earnings di⁄erentials.
The 0.25 coe¢ cient is measured using all changes in inequality, and this approach may un-
derstate the elasticity due to earnings inequality itself. By mixing growth in inequality due to
labor market di⁄erentials with growth in inequality outside of the labor market, the 0.25 coef-
￿cient may underestimate the extent to which preferences regarding compensation di⁄erential
expand to accommodate increases in earnings inequality. In addition to proposing wages for oc-
cupations, the ISSP surveys ask respondents what they think occupations actually earn. Fixed
e⁄ect regressions of Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio on the perceived wage ratio
for doctors and unskilled workers yield elasticities of about 0.6. That is, growth in perceived
inequality is again associated with larger proposed distributions, but not as wide as the per-
ceived increase itself. This 0.6 elasticity ￿nding, along with the reported results using national
inequality changes, leads to the conclusion that social preferences over wage di⁄erentials expand
to accommodate substantial portions, but not all, of growth in earnings inequality. These pat-
terns suggest that short-run inequality shocks can be reinforced in the labor market, and that
changes in compensation di⁄erentials due to changing factors of production are only modestly
retarded by social preferences.
The second column of Table 2 adds each nation￿ s log GDP per capita to capture movements
in the overall wealth of the country, as well as Demographic Controls and Mobility Controls.
Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and income dummies. Mo-
bility Controls incorporate respondents￿answers to other ISSP questions that reveal beliefs and
7experiences regarding social mobility. ISSP regressions include two questions asking respon-
dents to rate the importance of being from a wealthy family or of knowing the right people for
getting ahead. Respondents believing these important signi￿cantly favor more redistribution.
Past mobility experiences are also modeled by respondents￿ratings of the status of their jobs
compared to their fathers￿jobs; respondents believing their jobs are better than their fathers￿
are signi￿cantly less likely to support redistribution.8
The magnitudes and signi￿cance of the ￿ coe¢ cients on the gini estimates are robust to
including these Demographic and Mobility Controls. Column 3 further shows the results are
robust to including Work Controls of dummies for self-employed, supervisor, unemployed, and
a union member.9 Coe¢ cient elasticities are very similar after including these covariates. The
coe¢ cients in the WVS regressions continue to suggest a higher elasticity of about 35%. The
higher share of developing countries in the WVS sample likely plays a role in these larger partial
correlations. Also, the larger estimates may be the product of o⁄ering respondents ten choices
rather than ￿ve, making it easier to capture shifts in attitude. The speci￿c wording of this
question may also contribute, as further discussed in the Data Appendix.
Poorer and transitional countries tend to have higher support for redistribution than their
OECD counterparts with similar levels of inequality (Austen 1999, Suhrcke 2001). Moreover,
they demonstrate signi￿cant changes in attitudes and inequality levels that dwarf the more-
stable advanced nations. To ensure the sample composition between OECD and non-OECD
countries is not driving the results, Column 4 includes Year x OECD dummies. Likewise, the
￿fth column incorporates Year x Transition Economy dummies. The point estimates of the
￿ coe¢ cients typically decline when forcing the variation to be within the subgroups, but the
elasticities mostly remain economically and statistically important. Kerr (2005) extends the
graphical analysis in Figure 1 to also show the variations in these subgroups.10
2.4 Extensions and Discussion of Identi￿cation
The sample employed in Table 2 builds o⁄ of the ISSP Social Inequality module. The Gov-
ernment Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the Role of the
8The 1990 and 1995 WVS surveys asked respondents to rate whether hard work or luck determines success
or failure. The reported WVS results are robust to focusing on these survey years and including this control.
9Coe¢ cients on the Demographic and Work Controls follow the patterns found in previous cross-sectional
studies (e.g., Suhrcke 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). As the quality of income data varies substantially across
surveys and countries, respondents are grouped into family-income quintiles for each survey year. Support for
redistribution declines with income; support also tends to be lower among male and more-educated respondents.
Self-employed workers and supervisors tend to have less support for redistribution, while unemployed workers
and union members are more supportive. While reasonable, the direction of these ￿ndings should be treated with
caution as income variation not captured by the quintile groupings may be loading onto other demographic and
work characteristics. Finally, race/minority status is not included in the demographics; later results indicate this
is an important factor for the United States (e.g., Luttmer 2001, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Fong and Luttmer
2011).
10Very similar results are obtained without the macroeconomic controls. For example, elasticities for Gov-
ernment Responsibility and Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.161 (0.057) and 0.260 (0.076),
respectively, when only considering inequality and country and year ￿xed e⁄ects.
8Government modules since 1985. A longer panel can be constructed that combines surveys from
these two modules. While the panel enjoys more countries and higher-frequency variation in
macroeconomic conditions, it unfortunately lacks the important Mobility Controls. The ￿ndings
from this longer panel mirror those in Table 2. A second version of the Government Respon-
sibility question is also included in the Role of the Government surveys and the ISSP Religion
modules. Results from this third panel are also consistent with those presented in Table 2. The
stability of the ￿ndings through shifting time intervals and countries surveyed speaks to the
robustness of the measured short-run response in redistribution preferences.
A causal interpretation for these results is reasonable, although not assured. Two basic con-
cerns are the endogenous relationship between inequality and preferences (i.e., that preferences
also in￿ uence the inequality levels) and omitted-variable biases. The direction of the results
suggests that the reverse-causality concern is weak. It is di¢ cult to argue that changes in so-
cial preferences to favor more income equalization produced increases in inequality, while it is
very reasonable that increased inequality led to greater support for redistribution. Employ-
ing disposable-income inequalities rather than gross-income inequalities may bias the coe¢ cient
magnitudes slightly, but will not change the direction of the ￿ndings. On a similar note, this
study concludes that adjustments in preferences for compensation di⁄erentials allow inequality
to become entrenched in the labor market. While these results have greater scope for reverse
causality, the growing concern by respondents over income inequality and the greater support for
government-led interventions suggest that the wider proposed wage di⁄erentials are primarily a
reaction to the inequality changes, albeit one that sustains the inequality increase.
It may be possible, however, to argue an omitted factor prompted both the increases in
inequality and the changes in social preferences. For example, an increased openness to trade
may have raised inequality and also increased desire for government income stabilization out
of fear of globalization (and unrelated to the change in inequality itself). As noted earlier,
the consistent results of higher inequality being associated with greater concern over income
disparities suggest, however, that the most plausible interpretation is the increased inequality
acted directly on social preferences. A more-rigorous instrument strategy employed with the U.S.
data will also support this interpretation. Unfortunately, the U.S. survey employed in the next
section does not contain wage di⁄erential questions like the ISSP. Thus, the U.S. instruments
are only able to assess causality for the general redistribution result.11
11Suggestive evidence from the international panel can be taken from an approach that instruments each coun-
try￿ s inequality trends using the inequality trend of its closest neighbor. Second-stage elasticities for Government
Responsibility and Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio are 0.234 (0.100) and 0.198 (0.125), respec-
tively, when using the framework in Column 1 of Table 2. The instrument, however, is weak with a ￿rst-stage
coe¢ cient of 0.615 (0.336) and an F-statistic of 3.2 (standard errors clustered by country). This weakness and
concerns over the exclusion restriction suggest cautious interpretation.
93 Preferences in U.S. Surveys
To complement the international ￿ndings, regional variation in inequality and support for re-
distribution from the United States is explored next. This study is important for three reasons.
First, while national inequality would be the most perceived dimension for smaller countries
such as Bulgaria or Ireland, regional di⁄erences may be more important for large nations that
display signi￿cant heterogeneity in economic activity. Moreover, a substantial fraction of policy
and budget decisions in the United States are made at the state or city level, with o¢ cials ac-
countable to their local constituents. Finally, but certainly not least from a research perspective,
the quality and quantity of U.S. data a⁄ord extensions and instruments that are not possible in
international studies.
3.1 GSS Data Structure
U.S. social preferences are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS has been
conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging from 1400 to
3000 adults. The analysis considers four questions on the survey through 2000. The ￿rst
question asks on a three-point scale whether the United States should be spending more or less
money on welfare (Welfare Spending); an identical question regarding spending for the space
exploration program (Space Exploration Program Spending) is also considered as a falsi￿cation
exercise similar to the con￿ ict between the young and old question in the international study.
A third question (GSS Income Equalization) documents respondent support on a seven-point
scale for the federal government￿ s reduction of income di⁄erences between the rich and the poor.
Responses are again ordered so that higher values correspond to higher support for the reduction
of inequality.12
The analysis also considers how changes in political-party a¢ liation correlate with changing
inequality levels (Party Identi￿cation). Respondents are asked to state their party preference
and the strength of this association on a seven-point scale, with one being strongly Republican
and seven being strongly Democrat. Of course, many other factors in￿ uence party a¢ liation,
and the platforms of parties demonstrate temporal and regional variation. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to portray the Democratic Party over the last three decades as supporting higher
levels of redistribution from the United States￿wealthy classes to its poorer classes than the
Republican Party. Regressions with this question study whether higher inequality is associated
with changes in political a¢ liation, in addition to changes in support for welfare programs. The
Data Appendix details the wording of these four questions.
The ￿nal requirements for the U.S. analyses are the important inequality metrics. The rich-
12To validate these surveys, Luttmer (2001) demonstrates that over 30% of the variation in state welfare-bene￿t
levels can be explained through an interaction of attitudes towards welfare with state demographic compositions.
He also considers how norms for redistribution modeled with the GSS mirror voting patterns in a California
proposition.
10ness of U.S. data o⁄ers additional ￿ exibility, and two metrics of overall inequality are considered.
Modeling inequality with regional log gini estimates a⁄ords comparisons to the earlier interna-
tional work. The detailed data also allow consideration of inequality trends for di⁄erent parts of
the income distribution. Thus, overall inequality is additionally modeled as the di⁄erential be-
tween the log 80th and 20th percentiles. After considering overall inequality, the 80-20 di⁄erential
is disaggregated into the changes in inequality in the upper and lower halves of the distribution
(i.e., the 80-50 and 50-20 di⁄erentials). Inequality estimates in this section are calculated over
disposable family income for the four primary Census regions (i.e., Northeast, Midwest, South,
and West) from the March Current Population Surveys (CPS). Robustness checks show these
results are representative of other income de￿nitions (e.g., pre-tax family labor earnings, hourly
wage) and lower levels of regional aggregation (e.g., nine Census regions, states).13
Figure 2 plots the mean response to the GSS Welfare Spending question and the 80-20
income di⁄erential for each region by year. Two identi￿cation issues for the U.S. ￿ndings can be
discerned from this graph. First, di⁄erences in regional inequality trends exist (the solid line).
While the South begins with signi￿cantly higher inequality than the other regions in the early
1970s, the strong growth in inequality in the Northeast and West results in the three regions
being approximately equal by the late 1990s. The Midwest, while also experiencing an increase
in inequality, remains signi￿cantly lower than the South throughout the period. Unlike the
international analysis, however, none of the regions experience a period of substantial decline in
inequality. Thus the inference is from stable inequality or relative increases in inequality.
Second, the dramatic swings in the mid-1970s and 1990s highlight that regional variation in
welfare support can be second-order to large national shifts, likely due to political swings. The
signi￿cant decline in support in the mid-1970s is linked to the explosion in welfare caseloads in
the prior decade (e.g., Mo¢ tt, Ribar, and Wilhelm 1998), while the large dip in the mid-1990s
surrounds the 1994 Republican Revolution during Clinton￿ s ￿rst term. The close co-movement
of regional inequality and Welfare Spending preferences between these periods is quite striking.
The national trends in inequality and social preferences are absorbed by the year e⁄ects, while
systematic levels di⁄erences between regions are controlled for by geographic ￿xed e⁄ects. Given
13Three levels of geographic aggregation and three forms of inequality are considered for the United States.
On the geographic dimension, inequality estimates for Census regions (four or nine) are calculated from the
March CPS ￿les. These annual measures are preferred since decade-based measurements can miss important
￿ uctuations, most noticeably the signi￿cant expansion in family-income inequality during the recessions of the
early 1980s and 1990s. The sample sizes of the March CPS are insu¢ cient, however, for state-level analyses and
states are not identi￿ed until 1977. State-level statistics are instead calculated from the Census for each decade.
Three income de￿nitions are considered: post-tax disposable family income from all sources, pre-tax family
labor earnings, and hourly wages. The ￿rst two family measures are calculated over family equivalents using
Danziger and Gottschalk￿ s (1995) procedure of dividing by an in￿ ation-adjusted poverty-line estimate for a family
of similar composition (i.e., the number and ages of adults and children in the family unit). Additional procedures
for preparing the sample (e.g., the exclusion of military families, adjustment of top-codes) follow Danziger and
Gottschalk (1995), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Katz and Autor (1999).
In each analysis, the region ￿xed e⁄ects and median income levels are adjusted to the appropriate geographic
aggregation; median income levels are additionally adjusted to re￿ ect the income de￿nition used in the inequality
calculation. The Data Appendix reports the regional disposable-income 80-20 di⁄erential estimates employed in
the primary regressions.
11the importance of these national elements, the regression coe¢ cients for the regional variation
may be smaller than those captured in the international estimations.14
3.2 U.S. Preferences Results
Table 3A considers a set of speci￿cations similar to the international regressions studied in
Table 2; Table 3B replaces the log gini inequality metrics with log 80-20 income di⁄erentials.
Standard errors are bootstrapped for the U.S. analysis.15 Column 1 of both speci￿cations ￿nds
changes in regional inequality partially correlate with a statistically signi￿cant increase in support
for all three preferences when only year and region ￿xed e⁄ects are included. As expected,
the coe¢ cients are somewhat smaller than those found in the international regressions, as the
regional variation is weaker than national trends. As a falsi￿cation exercise for Welfare Spending,
if anything respondents urge a decline in Space Exploration Program Spending when inequality
increases, but this result is not precisely measured.
As before, Columns 2 and 3 further show the magnitudes and statistical signi￿cance of the
coe¢ cients are robust to including the regional median income (akin to the national GDP per
capita) and Demographic Controls, Mobility Controls, and Work Controls. Unfortunately, in-
corporating many GSS social-mobility variables severely limits the sample size; the regressions
only include a question that asks whether the ￿nancial position of a respondent￿ s family has
improved, worsened, or stayed the same over the last few years. The GSS does, however, collect
race data. Non-white respondents are found in the fourth column to have signi￿cantly higher
support for redistribution, even after including income levels and the other Demographic Con-
trols. The coe¢ cients for Welfare Spending and Party Identi￿cation remain of similar size and
signi￿cance, but those for Income Equalization diminish. These results are robust to excluding
the South from the analysis.16;17
3.3 Empirical Extensions
A signi￿cant concern about the analysis thus far is that gini estimates only measure overall
inequality. A detailed exploration should further identify the subsets of the income distribution
that are most important for changes in social preferences. While more-disaggregated interna-
tional statistics are very rare and typically of poor quality, U.S. data are available. Table 4
14While representative, the mean regional responses should be treated with caution. The sampling design
of the GSS results in certain states or metropolitan areas with distinct di⁄erences in social preferences from
their surrounding region entering and leaving the survey (e.g., the more-religious Utah in the West). While the
regression results control for these shifts, the regional mean responses do not.
15The ISSP and WVS have sample weights that prohibit bootstrapping. Estimations that exclude the sample
weights and bootstrap con￿rm Table 2￿ s ￿ndings, with the results stronger and more precisely estimated.
16Demographic surveys often ￿nd respondents over-estimate their relative ￿nancial position. In addition to
actual incomes, the GSS collects respondents￿perceptions of their incomes compared to the national average.
The results are robust to using these perceptions rather than actual income levels.
17Increases in inequality are also associated with shifts in party identi￿cation to the left in the ISSP and WVS
samples. These results are not emphasized due to the lack of party comparability across countries compared to
the U.S. analysis. There is also intriguing evidence of declines in political participation as inequality increases.
12decomposes the 80-20 inequality into the 80-50 and 50-20 di⁄erentials. The results suggest
that trends in inequality in the lower half of the distribution (i.e., the poor being increasingly
left behind) are most responsible for the aggregate results previously identi￿ed for the United
States. Using 90-50 and 50-10 trends, which demonstrate less co-movement than the 80-50 and
50-20 series, yields signi￿cant results for the 50-10 ratio in all regressions (including Income
Equalization).18
Two additional extensions reported in Kerr (2005) consider whether the average increase in
support for redistribution with rising inequality masks di⁄erences among income classes. While
the demographic characteristics of respondents are statistically signi￿cant for explaining survey
answers, Piketty (1996a,b, 1999a) notes the overall level of disagreement within a country about
distributive equality is usually small vis-￿-vis other social issues (e.g., death penalty). Section 2
found, however, that perceptions of con￿ ict between the poor and the rich increase with rising
inequality, and it is important to clarify if the average response belies increasing disagreement
among classes about appropriate redistribution levels. The rich may become more protective of
their wealth as the gap grows, perhaps out of concern over larger transfers or perhaps out of
reduced fear that they too may one day be poor. Altruistic motives, however, may yield greater
assistance from the wealthy as disparity widens.
A ￿rst test for this heterogeneity interacts the inequality measures with whether respondents
are in the top-two income quintiles or the bottom-two income quintiles. These estimations do
not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences by class for the GSS Welfare Spending or Income Equalization
variables. Similar null results for income-quintile interactions are also present in the ISSP and
WVS. Concern over rising inequality grows in all income groups (while the overall levels are
higher in poor households). GSS respondents in the bottom-two quintiles are disproportionately
more likely to align themselves with the Democratic Party as inequalities in their regions increase.
This result, however, is sensitive to more structured controls like interacting a time trend with
being in the upper-two or lower-two income quintiles, suggesting that other factors may be
playing a role.19
A second test interacts the inequality measures with whether the respondent lives near some-
one of the opposite race. Luttmer (2001) ￿nds support for welfare spending increases as the share
of local recipients from a respondent￿ s racial group rises. Lind (2007) also ￿nds aggregate ev-
idence that inequality between racial groups versus inequality within racial groups can have
opposite e⁄ects for redistribution outcomes. The interacted coe¢ cient for the Welfare Spending
18Mo¢ tt, Ribar, and Wilhelm (1998) ￿nd evidence that declining welfare-bene￿t levels can be linked to declin-
ing low-skill wages, as voters seek to maintain a target bene￿t-wage ratio (perhaps to preserve equity between
working and non-working poor or to minimize employment disincentives). The disaggregated income inequality
results￿ in particular, the positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the 50-20 ratio￿ are robust to including measures
of the 15th or 25th percentile wages.
19McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2003) note increases in U.S. inequality have moved in tandem with stronger
ideological di⁄erences over redistribution and more-polarized party politics. While income has become a stronger
predictor of party a¢ liation over the last twenty-￿ve years, their work also suggests inequality bears limited
responsibility for the polarization.
13regression agrees with these studies￿ the increase in redistribution support associated with ris-
ing inequality is diminished in racially heterogeneous neighborhoods. There is no clear e⁄ect for
the Income Equalization measure.
These results suggest changes in support for government-led redistribution are fairly uniform
across income groups. This ￿nding is in agreement with Rawlsian models like Piketty (1995),
where di⁄erent classes have similar views on distributive equality holding ￿xed beliefs about
incentive costs. On the other hand, the standard median-voter model (e.g., Meltzer and Richard
1981) suggests increases in inequality lead to a divergence in preferences for redistribution as
gaps to the median income widen. A limitation to these ￿ndings, however, is important to note.
Piketty and Saez (2003) ￿nd a tremendous increase in the concentration of wealth among the very
rich in the United States (i.e., the top 1% and even smaller fractions). Atkinson, Piketty, and
Saez (2011) review the work that has followed regarding top income shares. Unfortunately, the
data cannot be used for an analysis for these super-wealthy individuals, executive compensation
committees, and similar institutions.
4 U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument
U.S. regional estimations agree with the earlier international results: increases in inequality
partially correlate with increases in desire for government-led redistribution. In addition to
￿nding this e⁄ect on two levels, it was earlier noted that the direction of the results, the lagging
of inequality, and the signi￿cance of survey questions focused on inequality itself suggest a causal
interpretation is reasonable, although still not assured. In this section, an instrument designed
for the U.S. regional variation further undergirds this claim.
In recent empirical studies, labor economists note the role of the minimum wage in rising
U.S. inequality, especially during the 1979-1989 period when the real (i.e., in￿ ation-adjusted)
value of the federal rate declined by 24%.20 While these substantial swings in mandated federal
rates can be taken as exogenous from the perspective of individual states or regions, they do
not provide the necessary regional variation by themselves. An appropriate instrument can be
designed, however, through the interaction of these national trends with predetermined regional
characteristics that govern how important minimum-wage mandates are for the local economy.
The year e⁄ects absorb the national dynamics of the changing federal rate, and the pre-existing
regional traits are controlled for by the geographic ￿xed e⁄ects. The identifying assumption is
that the residual region-year interactions can serve as an instrument for the region-year inequality
trends (which are themselves also subject to the ￿xed e⁄ects).
This study employs regional coverage ratios, de￿ned as the percent of the working popula-
tion protected by the minimum-wage statutes, as the interaction terms. Regions di⁄er in the
20For example, Card and Krueger (1995); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Lee (1999); Golan, Perlo⁄,
and Wu (2001a,b); Card and DiNardo (2002); Autor, Manning, and Smith (2010); and Ahn, Arcidiacono, and
Wessels (2011).
14composition of their economic activity, and the federal minimum-wage mandates are not applied
equally to industries (e.g., 1970-2000 coverage rates in agriculture averaged 41% versus manufac-
turing￿ s 97%). The larger the fraction of a region￿ s population covered by the federal statutes,
the more impact federal rates have on the local economy. The simplest interaction term would
be the 1970 coverage rate; in a slight design improvement, the interaction term is built instead
as the expected coverage in year t for each region. This modi￿cation allows incorporation of
trends in national coverage rates due to changing federal legislation (especially in the mid 1970s),
thereby raising the quality of the ￿rst-stage estimations. The inequality instrument for region r
and year t takes the form
INEQ ￿ IVr;t = ln(FED1970=FEDt) ￿ E1970COVr;t;
where
E1970COVr;t = 1 ￿
P
j IND%j;r;1970 ￿ (COVj;1970=COVj;t);
with j indexing industries. The two parts of this interaction deserve careful explanation. The
construction of the second element, E1970COVr;t, is the more complicated. It is the expected
coverage rate in region r for year t, estimated from the 1970 industrial composition of the working
poor and changes in national coverage rates by industry. IND%j;r;1970 is the percent of a region￿ s
workforce from the 1970 Census who are both earning less than the minimum wage and working
in industry j. By itself,
P
j IND%j;r;1970 would produce the actual percentage of the region￿ s
working population earning less than the federal minimum wage in 1970. COVj;1970=COVj;t is the
ratio of the national coverage rate for industry j in 1970 to that in year t. From a starting value
of one, the ratio moves above one for industries where the coverage rates decrease compared to
1970 levels; it moves below one when coverage rates increase.21
The combination of these terms is the expected percentage of a region￿ s workforce earning be-
low the minimum wage in year t. The starting 1970 level of
P
j IND%j;r;1970￿(COVj;1970=COVj;t)
is still the actual workforce percentage earning below the 1970 federal rate in each region (as the
coverage ratio for all industries is one). For subsequent years, it is expected that the percentage
of the population earning below the minimum wage will decline in region r if its poor workers
were primarily employed in industries where the coverage rate later increased. On the other
hand, little change is expected in states or regions where very few workers were initially below
the minimum wage or where the poor worked in industries for which the coverage rate did not
change signi￿cantly. Finally, 1 ￿
P
j IND%j;r;1970 ￿ (COVj;1970=COVj;t) estimates the percent of
the population covered by the minimum-wage mandates and thus the potential importance of
changes in the federal rate for the region￿ s inequality level.
21Coverage rates are at the one-digit SIC level and exclude government employees (e.g., Nordlund 1997, United
States Department of Labor 1998). Coverage rates have not been identi￿ed for 1989 or after 1996. For the main
estimations, a linear interpolation is employed for 1989 and observations post-1997 are assigned 1996 values; the
results are robust to dropping these missing years. Unfortunately, the coverage data are not disaggregated to
where each observation￿ s own region could be excluded. As the Data Appendix shows, the expected coverage
rate calculations produce only a slight trend vis-￿-vis ￿xed 1970 levels.
15Turning to the ￿rst term, ln(FED1970=FEDt), the log ratio of the real federal minimum-
wage rate in 1970 to the rate in year t takes an initial value at zero for 1970. In years when the
real federal rate is greater than the real federal rate for 1970, this component of the instrument
has a negative value, and vice versa. Note that some states have mandated minimum wages
that exceed the federal rate. These are not considered as the local legislation could clearly be
endogenous to the inequality levels. The Data Appendix provides descriptive statistics for these
two components of the instrument.
The instrument is then the interaction of shifts in the real federal rate with the expected
coverage level, or how much the federal legislation matters for a region. The instrument comes
only from the interaction between these two elements. The individual trends of the real federal
rate and industry coverage rates are absorbed by the year e⁄ects. Geographic ￿xed e⁄ects control
for the region￿ s predetermined industrial composition of poor workers. The instrument does not
have a level per se￿ its value for all regions is zero when the real federal rate is equal to its
1970 level (i.e., 1970 itself, approximately so in 1975, 1976 and 1981). It relies on the region
￿xed e⁄ects to control for the mean inequality positions of each area. Finally, the instrument is
designed to have a positive ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient. The E1970COVr;t term is always positive and
only governs the magnitude of the response; the ln(FED1970=FEDt) component is positive when
the current federal rate is below its 1970 level, which should correspond to rising inequality, and
vice versa.
Figure 3 plots a graphical version of the ￿rst stage for each region. The lines for the minimum-
wage instrument (the solid line) and the inequality level (the line with circles) are residuals after
year and geographic ￿xed e⁄ects are removed. The expected ￿rst-stage relationship is apparent
within each region. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, the
￿rst-stage coe¢ cient for regional gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40), with an F statistic of 11.7 and a
partial R2 of 0.16. The ￿rst-stage coe¢ cient for the regional log 80-20 di⁄erential is 1.53 (0.53),
with an F statistic of 7.3 and a partial R2 of 0.10.
Tables 5A and 5B present the detailed results of the instrumental-variable speci￿cations
for the log gini and 80-20 di⁄erentials, respectively. As inequality is lagged one year in the
estimations, the instrument is lagged as well. The second-stage results con￿rm the least-square
speci￿cations discussed earlier; a one standard-deviation increase in inequality is now found
to produce 20% of a standard-deviation shift in support for government-led redistribution and
political party identi￿cation. Substantially weaker results are found on the other two variables.
The instrument speci￿cations are robust to using other forms of aggregate inequality (90-10
di⁄erentials, entropy) or focusing on the lower half of the income distribution through 50-20
di⁄erentials. The small increase in coe¢ cient magnitude from the least squares results is likely
due to the instrument focusing on inequality in the lower part of the income distribution.
Table 6 concludes by replicating the Column 2 regressions of Tables 3A and 5A (i.e., esti-
mations including median income levels, Demographic Controls, and Mobility Controls) across
16three levels of geographic aggregation and three income de￿nitions. The ￿rst three columns are
for least-squares regressions, while the last three columns are for instrumental-variable speci-
￿cations. The two regional speci￿cations are annual and derived from the March CPS while
the state speci￿cations are at the decade level and derived from the Census. The least-squares
permutations are well-behaved and generally indicate a moderate decline in coe¢ cient size as
speci￿cations move away from disposable family income towards the hourly wage de￿nition. The
declining coe¢ cient sizes with lower levels of geographic aggregation mirror the earlier coe¢ cient
reduction from the international regressions to the four Census regions variation. However, these
two trends are weaker in the instrumental-variable permutations. While larger standard errors
are evident in some state-level or hourly wage speci￿cations, the instrumental-variable results
in general are robust across these dimensions. The Data Appendix describes further robustness
checks made on the instrument￿ s design.
5 Conclusions
This study characterizes how changes in inequality a⁄ect social attitudes towards government-led
redistribution and compensation di⁄erentials. Market-based factors have substantially increased
inequality in the United States over the last three decades. If the inequality caused by these
mechanisms reduces social preferences regarding distributive equality, the inequality can become
ampli￿ed and entrenched. While international and U.S. regional cross-sections often display a
strong, negative correlation between inequality and support for redistribution, this study ￿nds
countries and states do not evolve along this pattern in the short-run.
Controlling for initial positions and respondent views of social mobility, local changes in
inequality are positively and signi￿cantly correlated with changes in support for government-led
redistribution. While greater class con￿ ict is perceived along income dimensions, the increases in
support for redistribution among wealthy individuals are as strong as those of poorer individuals.
To the extent the forces driving inequality also alter the underlying beliefs (e.g., determinants
of success, mobility experiences, incentive costs) most important for determining the long-term
trade-o⁄ between inequality and redistribution preferences, then these forces may contribute
to reduced concern over the disparity. But the results of this study suggest that a short-term
increase in inequality is unlikely to prompt a vicious cycle where support for redistribution
declines, thereby promoting further increase in inequality.
On the other hand, signi￿cant growth in proposed wage di⁄erentials are evident in the inter-
national analyses with higher inequality. While less than one-for-one, increases in inequality are
associated with greater acceptance of wage disparities. This pattern suggests that labor market
changes may reinforce inequality growth.
Several important areas for future research exist. Political economists have long studied
reasons for the negative cross-sectional relationship between inequality and support for redis-
17tribution; this study explored localized movements around these long-run positions. Recent
theoretical research considers endogenous shifts in long-term positions (e.g., Benabou 2002, Has-
sler et. al. 2003); as more data become available, future research should empirically test these
longer-term dynamics. Such shifts will further clarify the primal factors behind cross-sectional
di⁄erences, highlight whether the concerned responses noted here are governed by important
thresholds or critical-mass points, and identify mechanisms beyond ideology that can contribute
to the formation of vicious cycles.
It is also important to characterize the channels through which inequality and preferences in-
teract. For instance, increasing social strati￿cation22 may amplify or diminish the direct e⁄ect of
increasing inequality on social preferences. Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) report greater inequal-
ity is particularly correlated with reduced membership in church and service groups, activities
often associated with assisting the less fortunate. Watson (2009) links inequality with greater
income segregation in cities. This deterioration of civic bonds may weaken support for redis-
tribution. On the other hand, Luttmer (2001) argues free-rider concerns likely reduce support
for welfare policies, and perhaps these concerns are weakened in more-segmented communities.
It is also unclear how the non-pecuniary status desires that can limit support for redistribution
change in a more-strati￿ed society (e.g., Corneo and Gruner 2000, 2002). A better understanding
of how strati￿cation and other channels facilitate the interaction of inequality and preferences
will a⁄ord more-causal assessments and aid in policy recommendations.
Finally, and most importantly, future research should trace out how changes in social pref-
erences translate into policy outcomes. Existing studies examining the connection of increases
in inequality to policy changes related to redistribution ￿nd mixed results.23 The ￿ndings of
this paper suggest that social preferences regarding inequality adjust to desire more redistribu-
tion while allowing greater labor market inequality. Di⁄erent political systems￿ including such
diverse issues as government structure, campaign ￿nancing laws, voter participation, etc.￿ will
in￿ uence whether shifts in preferences produce important policy changes or not. The importance
of franchising groups favoring higher redistribution and the disproportionate in￿ uence of elites
are often noted in particular.24 How political systems are structured will govern whether rising
latent concerns for redistribution produce higher e⁄ective support to which politicians are held
accountable.
22For example, Putnam (2000); Benabou (1993, 1996); and Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000).
23Recent examples include Rodriguez (1999); Piketty (1999b); Caminada and Goudswaard (2001); Hassler
et. al. (2003); Gundersen and Ziliak (2004); Chernick (2005); Schwabish, Smeeding, and Osberg (2006); Leigh
(2008); Schwabish (2008); Boustan et al. (2010); Corcoran and Evans (2010); and Cooper, Lutz, and Palumbo
(2011).
24For example, Husted and Kenny (1997); Lott and Kenny (1999); and Saint-Paul (2001).
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24Fig. 1: Social Preferences Regarding Inequality in ISSP Surveys 
Notes:  Panel 1A plots 1992 ISSP responses on the government’s responsibility to reduce income differences, with higher values 
indicating greater responsibility. Panel 1B plots the average proposed wage ratio for a doctor vs. unskilled worker. Countries with 
greater inequality express lower redistribution preferences and propose a wider wage distribution. Panels 1C and 1D consider 
1992-1999 changes. Increased inequality is associated with greater redistribution support and wider proposed wage ratios. Notes:  Figure plots the co-movement in U.S. regional inequality and average support for welfare spending among GSS 
respondents. The solid lines without circles are the average support on a three-point scale for greater welfare spending by 
respondents in the region, with higher values indicating greater support. The lines with circles are regional inequalities measured 
as the log 80-20 income differential from the March CPS. 
Fig. 2: U.S. Welfare Spending Preferences and Regional Inequality Notes:  Figure plots the first-stage relationship between the U.S. minimum-wage instrument and regional inequality.  The solid 
lines without circles are the residuals from regressing the minimum-wage instrument on region fixed effects, year fixed effects, 
and the region’s log median income level. The lines with circles are the residuals for regional inequality similarly constructed. 
Fig. 3: First Stage for U.S. Minimum-Wage Instrument Total Sample Long-Term Non Long-Term
OECD OECD
Countries 19 11 8
Respondents 54,091 31,083 23,008
Government Responsibility 3.65 3.41 3.96
(1-5 Scale) (1.19) (1.20) (1.10)
Progressive Taxation 4.02 3.97 4.10
(1-5 Scale) (0.77) (0.73) (0.82)
Proposed Doctor-Unskilled 3.80 4.16 3.35
Wage Ratio (8.17) (8.17) (8.16)
Inequality Acceptance 4.05 3.88 4.28
(1-5 Scale) (0.99) (0.99) (0.95)
Poor-Rich Conflict 2.52 2.45 2.62
(1-4 Scale) (0.84) (0.77) (0.90)
Young-Old Conflict 2.21 2.22 2.19
(1-4 Scale) (0.80) (0.75) (0.86)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.37 3.35 3.40
(0.17) (0.13) (0.22)
Countries 37 15 22
Respondents 137,006 51,104 85,902
WVS Income Equalization 5.25 5.31 5.22
(1-10 Scale) (3.01) (2.73) (3.17)
Log Gini Coefficient 3.51 3.35 3.60
(0.30) (0.16) (0.32)
Table 1: ISSP and WVS Descriptive Statistics
A. ISSP Social Inequality Panel
B. WVS Social Inequality Panel
Notes: Table provides descriptive statistics on social preferences for income inequality and government 
redistribution taken from the ISSP and WVS surveys.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher 
values indicate more concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio.  Variable 
means are reported with standard deviations indicated in parentheses.  Sample sizes in some regressions 
are smaller than total respondents as some respondents skipped questions; surveys also varied on the 
demographic and mobility information collected.  ISSP Long-Term OECD Members include AUS, AUT, 
CAN, DEU, GBR, ITA, JAP, NOR, NZL, SWE, and USA.  ISSP Non-Long-Term OECD Members 
include BGR, CZE, HUN, PHL, POL, RUS, SVK, and SVN.  WVS Long-Term OECD Members 
include AUT, BEL, CAN, DEU, ESP, FIN, FRA, GBR, IRL, ITA, JAP, NLD, NOR, SWE, and USA.  
WVS Non-Long-Term OECD Members include ARG, BGR, BLR, BRA, CHL, CHN, CZE, EST, HUN, 
IND, KOR, LTU, LVA, MEX, NGA, POL, ROM, RUS, SVK, SVN, TUR, and ZAF.Base Base Including Including Including
Regression Regression Worker OECD-Yr. Trans.-Yr.
Controls Effects Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log National 0.161 0.153 0.158 0.129 0.093
Gini Coefficient (0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.056) (0.058)
Observations 54,054 45,918 45,918 45,918 45,918
Log National 0.238 0.234 0.235 0.188 0.187
Gini Coefficient (0.071) (0.077) (0.076) (0.072) (0.090)
Log National 0.160 0.142 0.148 0.084 0.072
Gini Coefficient (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.049) (0.067)
Log National 0.124 0.135 0.135 0.116 0.133
Gini Coefficient (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.030) (0.035)
Log National -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.071 -0.013
Gini Coefficient (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.060) (0.062)
Log National 0.256 0.238 0.239 0.302 0.241
Gini Coefficient (0.089) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.089)
Log National 0.358 0.374 0.371 0.341 0.266
Gini Coefficient (0.100) (0.106) (0.106) (0.116) (0.146)
Observations 137,006 118,499 118,499 118,499 118,499
D. Poor-Rich Conflict Responses
E. Young-Old Conflict Responses
F. Log Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Wage Ratio Responses
WVS Panel
G. WVS Income Equalization Responses
Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between national inequality and preferences for redistribution 
and compensation differentials taken from ISSP and WVS.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher 
values indicate more concerned responses, excepting the proposed doctor-unskilled wage ratio.  Regressions 
include country and year fixed effects.  Regressions include country-year controls for log GDP per capita, 
share of workers in industry, and share of workers in services.  Demographic Controls include sex, marital 
status, age, education, and income dummies.  Mobility Controls include respondents’ views on the 
determinants of success (e.g., knowledge, family connections) and comparisons of their jobs to their fathers’ 
jobs (ISSP).  Work Controls include self-employed, unemployed, supervisor, and union-member dummies.  
Inequality measures are lagged one period.  Variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit standard 
deviation.  Regressions are weighted for nationally representative samples and equal cross-national weight.  
Standard errors clustered by country are in parentheses.  Observation counts for Government Responsibility 
are representative for other ISSP variables.  
Table 2: ISSP and WVS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
ISSP Social Inequality Panel
A. Government Responsibility Responses
B. Progressive Taxation Responses
C. Inequality Acceptance ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.130 0.135 0.114 0.132
Gini Coefficient (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.031)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.086 0.040 0.059 0.023
Gini Coefficient (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.040)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.198 0.206 0.217 0.196
Gini Coefficient (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) (0.028)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional -0.044 -0.047 -0.067 -0.047
Gini Coefficient (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: Regressions consider the relationship between regional inequality and preferences for 
redistribution taken from GSS.  Survey responses are ordered such that higher values indicate more 
concerned responses.  Regressions include the log median income for each region, region fixed effects, 
and year fixed effects.  Demographic Controls include sex, marital status, age, education, and income 
dummies.  Mobility Controls include recent changes in family financial position.  Work Controls 
include self-employed, unemployed, and union-member dummies.  Racial Controls include non-white 
respondent dummy.  Inequality measures are lagged one period.  Variables are transformed to have 
zero mean and unit standard deviation.  Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.  
Table 3A: GSS Regressions with Aggregate Gini Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.098 0.114 0.127 0.112
80/20 Differential (0.030) (0.026) (0.036) (0.030)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.099 0.040 0.051 0.026
80/20 Differential (0.024) (0.039) (0.035) (0.028)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.135 0.164 0.173 0.158
80/20 Differential (0.022) (0.022) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional 0.002 -0.015 -0.021 -0.016
80/20 Differential (0.026) (0.029) (0.038) (0.032)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Table 3A.
Table 3B: GSS Regressions with 80-20 Income Differential Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.013 0.013 0.002 0.001
80/50 Differential (0.028) (0.031) (0.032) (0.030)
Log Regional 0.072 0.084 0.098 0.086
50/20 Differential (0.020) (0.023) (0.030) (0.027)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.067 0.042 0.042 0.028
80/50 Differential (0.032) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
Log Regional 0.046 0.011 0.020 0.007
50/20 Differential (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.036 0.035 0.002 0.015
80/50 Differential (0.027) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024)
Log Regional 0.093 0.114 0.137 0.118
50/20 Differential (0.014) (0.021) (0.020) (0.015)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,791
Log Regional 0.017 0.002 -0.008 0.010
80/50 Differential (0.036) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036)
Log Regional -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016
50/20 Differential (0.019) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Tables 3A and 3B. 
Table 4: GSS Regressions with Disaggregated Inequality
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.222 0.225 0.220 0.218
Gini Coefficient (0.064) (0.066) (0.080) (0.073)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.122 0.079 0.095 0.063
Gini Coefficient (0.112) (0.089) (0.093) (0.124)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.220 0.247 0.204 0.239
Gini Coefficient (0.049) (0.061) (0.058) (0.054)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,971
Log Regional -0.058 -0.038 -0.036 -0.041
Gini Coefficient (0.067) (0.062) (0.077) (0.070)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
Notes: See Tables 3A and 3B. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, 
the first-stage coefficient for regional gini inequality is 1.50 (0.40), with an F statistic of 11.7 and a 
partial R² of 0.16.
Table 5A: GSS Gini Regressions with Minimum-Wage Instrument
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses
D. Space Exploration Program Spending ResponsesBase Base Including Including
Regression Regression Worker Racial
Controls Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Regional 0.204 0.206 0.207 0.200
80/20 Differential (0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.067)
Observations 24,247 21,965 14,704 21,965
Log Regional 0.128 0.070 0.083 0.055
80/20 Differential (0.090) (0.091) (0.109) (0.080)
Observations 20,414 18,344 17,293 18,344
Log Regional 0.209 0.232 0.196 0.224
80/20 Differential (0.050) (0.053) (0.060) (0.062)
Observations 37,763 33,971 23,026 33,971
Log Regional -0.054 -0.035 -0.034 -0.038
80/20 Differential (0.066) (0.065) (0.077) (0.068)
Observations 23,942 21,757 14,574 21,757
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Notes: See Tables 3A and 3B. Estimated at the regional level and using bootstrapped standard errors, 
the first-stage coefficient for the regional log 80-20 differential is 1.53 (0.53), with an F statistic of 7.3 
and a partial R² of 0.10.
Table 5B: GSS 80-20 Regressions with Minimum-Wage Instrument
Including Demographic and Mobility Controls
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification ResponsesSource of Log 
80/20 Inequality Four Nine State Four Nine State
Metric Regions Regions Level Regions Regions Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post-Tax Family 0.114 0.061 0.081 0.206 0.194 0.151
Disposable Income (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.061) (0.056) (0.065)
Pre-Tax Family 0.105 0.068 0.041 0.209 0.215 0.207
Labor Earnings (0.034) (0.023) (0.022) (0.057) (0.056) (0.089)
Total Population 0.030 0.056 0.067 0.593 0.227 0.157
Hourly Wage (0.020) (0.016) (0.018) (0.216) (0.069) (0.074)
Post-Tax Family 0.040 0.027 0.068 0.070 0.042 0.125
Disposable Income (0.032) (0.030) (0.035) (0.074) (0.082) (0.211)
Pre-Tax Family 0.032 0.023 0.020 0.098 0.049 0.212
Labor Earnings (0.034) (0.023) (0.024) (0.149) (0.098) (0.333)
Total Population 0.054 0.018 0.053 0.305 0.047 0.268
Hourly Wage (0.021) (0.020) (0.027) (0.655) (0.163) (0.494)
Post-Tax Family 0.164 0.099 0.050 0.232 0.202 0.171
Disposable Income (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.056) (0.040) (0.044)
Pre-Tax Family 0.143 0.100 0.018 0.250 0.226 0.218
Labor Earnings (0.024) (0.018) (0.017) (0.051) (0.047) (0.061)
Total Population 0.066 0.038 0.056 0.636 0.235 0.202
Hourly Wage (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.180) (0.053) (0.060)
Post-Tax Family -0.015 -0.006 0.012 -0.035 -0.022 0.005
Disposable Income (0.029) (0.023) (0.022) (0.061) (0.044) (0.067)
Pre-Tax Family -0.034 -0.055 -0.007 -0.033 -0.023 0.007
Labor Earnings (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.071) (0.047) (0.073)
Total Population -0.022 -0.006 -0.012 -0.109 -0.032 -0.005
Hourly Wage (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.211) (0.072) (0.057)
D. Space Exploration Program Spending Responses
Notes: See Tables 3A and 5A.  Each coefficient is the result of a separate regression with the inequality measure 
indicated by the row title and the sample design indicated by the column header.  Regressions include Demographic 
and Mobility Controls, the log median income for each geographic region, geographic region fixed effects, and year 
fixed effects.  Median income covariates and geographic panel effects mirror the inequality measure employed.
Table 6: GSS Regressions with Extended Income Definitions and Regions
OLS IV
A. Welfare Spending Responses
B. Income Equalization Responses
C. Political Party Identification Responses1 Data Appendix
This appendix describes the dataset construction for "Income Inequality and Social Preferences
for Redistribution and Compensation Di⁄erentials".
2 International Opinion Polls (ISSP and WVS)
The international exercises employ the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and the
World Value Survey (WVS). To maintain a consistent presentation across international and
U.S. surveys, responses are ordered such that more-concerned views are associated with higher
numbers.
The ISSP analysis focuses on the 1987, 1992, and 1999 Social Inequality module; the Govern-
ment Responsibility and Progressive Taxation questions are also included in the 1985, 1990, and
1996 Role of the Government module. Responses to three complementary questions proxy social
preferences for government-led income redistribution: the ￿rst focusing on the responsibility of
the government in the transfer of income, the second considering progressive taxation, and the
third considering the acceptability of current income di⁄erences:
Q. (Government Responsibility) "It is the responsibility of the government to reduce




3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Q. (Progressive Taxation) "Do you think that people with high incomes should pay
a larger share of their income in taxes than those with low incomes, the same share,
or a smaller share?"
1. Much smaller share
2. Smaller
3. The same share
4. Larger
5. Much larger share




13. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Agree
5. Agree strongly
Three important characteristics of these questions should be noted. They shy away from
sensitive wording (e.g., words like "welfare" carry negative connotations) and they o⁄er respon-
dents a range of options that include a neutral stance. The Government Responsibility and
Progressive Taxation questions also do not reference a country￿ s current policy position (e.g.,
"do you think the government should be doing more to reduce the di⁄erences..."). Such relative
questions are more di¢ cult to evaluate in panel exercises.
Respondents are also asked their opinions on the appropriate salaries for a variety of occu-
pations. Instructions request preferences be pre-tax and regardless of perceptions of current pay
scales. From these responses, a Proposed Doctor-Unskilled Worker Wage Ratio is developed as
the log ratio of the wages suggested for a "doctor in general practice" and an "unskilled worker in
a factory". A higher ratio indicates a wider wage distribution (i.e., a ratio of one would indicate
unskilled workers and doctors should earn the same amount). The reported results winsorize the
raw ratio using the range [0.5, 100] prior to log transformation to limit the in￿ uence of outliers
in descriptive exercises like Table 1. Regression analyses are very robust to adjustments of this
procedure.
Other occupations present in all three Social Inequality surveys include a skilled factory
worker, a government minister, and a chairman of a large national company. When discussing
compensation di⁄erentials, the text also describes the evolution of the wage premiums between
these positions. Unfortunately, some surveys substitute a representative value for a salary
range or top code the maximum value. These adjustments have the most potential to in￿ u-
ence the chairman salary, which is why this study focuses more on the doctor wage rate. Sev-
eral techniques￿ dropping various survey years, using median estimations, imposing top codes,
winsorizing￿ demonstrate very similar outcomes to the primary panel.
Finally, two questions regarding the presence of con￿ icts between social groups are employed.
The ￿rst focuses on con￿ icts between the poor and the rich to validate respondents￿awareness
of the inequality in their countries, while a second question regarding con￿ ict between young
and old people is considered as a falsi￿cation exercise.
Q. (Poor-Rich Con￿ ict) "In all countries there are di⁄erences or even con￿ icts be-
tween di⁄erent social groups. In your opinion, in <R￿ s country> how much con￿ ict
is there between poor people and rich people?"
1. No con￿ icts
2. Not very strong con￿ icts
3. Strong con￿ icts
24. Very strong con￿ icts
Q. (Young-Old Con￿ ict) "... between young people and older people?"
1. No con￿ icts
2. Not very strong con￿ icts
3. Strong con￿ icts
4. Very strong con￿ icts
As a complement to the ISSP, this study also considers responses to a question included
in the 1990, 1995, and 2000 rounds of the WVS. This question (WVS Income Equalization)
asks respondents to rate their views regarding income equalization on a ten-point scale. Ten
is labeled, "Incomes should be made more equal." One is labeled, "We need larger income
di⁄erences as incentives for individual e⁄ort." While the WVS panel enjoys a more-diverse
group of developing economies, interpretation of this question is limited by its reference to the
country￿ s current position (i.e., more equal, larger di⁄erences) and asymmetric labeling of the
two extreme values. Nevertheless, ￿nding quantitatively and qualitatively similar results in a
di⁄erent sample is an important robustness check.
3 International Inequality Series
This subsection details the construction of the international gini estimates employed in the main
text. Nations participating in multiple International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) or World
Values Survey (WVS) rounds are included, although the former is this study￿ s primary interest.
Table A1 documents the constructed series and outlines the data sources. Data collection relied
heavily on the United Nations Development Programme￿ s World Income Inequality Database
(versions 1.0 and 2.0c), the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997,
2000), and the individual publications of national statistics agencies. The WIID1 includes the
earlier work of Deininger and Squire (1996) and was the original basis for this study. WIID2
is a 2008 revision that has been used to con￿rm the earlier series and extend where feasible to
include additional survey responses.1
The target gini concept is disposable household income based upon a nationally representative
sample. Although many sources, including LIS, divide by the square root of the household size,
equivalency scales are not consistent across countries. Data limitations prevent consideration of
gross (pre-transfers) household-income inequality. Gross metrics have the theoretical advantage
of being less in￿ uenced by current and past preferences for redistribution, although one can
argue disposable-income di⁄erences are what respondents are recalling when questioned. In
1The task here is to develop gini series covering the years included in the two survey programs. In doing
so, a longer horizon is often considered than what the surveys require for a particular country to establish more
con￿dence in the trends developed. These series, however, do not exhaust the inequality data available; gaps in
the sequences do not necessarily mean appropriate gini estimates are not available.
3the U.S. portion of this study, the form of inequality (e.g., gross versus disposable household
income, household labor earnings, hourly wage) is not critical for the results. A one-year lag in
inequality is targeted for each survey round, but contemporaneous and two-year or three-year
lagged measures are also accepted when necessary.
Selected series include multiple observations derived with a consistent technique and dataset.
Other sources not listed in Table A1 are also used to substantiate both levels and trends of the
chosen series, as well as to provide comparisons for how other income concepts are behaving
during the same period. In a number of cases, two or three series are pieced together to span the
time frame of this study (or as much of it as possible). In such cases, observations must share a
common or adjoining year as a levels check; moreover, overlapping intervals are examined when
available to ensure the series are following similar trends. Auxiliary series are also employed in
these exercises for veri￿cation purposes. Finally, the gini estimates are rescaled to match the
levels of LIS estimates around 1990 if the LIS is not employed directly in the construction of the
series (participating countries only).
Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) outline a number of pitfalls that can occur when piecing to-
gether series from secondary datasets. The dataset developed for this study attempts to address
these concerns while still assembling a meaningful panel of countries. However, it certainly falls
short of achieving "double harmonization" across countries and time, and Kerr (2005) identi￿es
questionable series due to poor quality data, alternative income concepts, splicing concerns, and
so on. The consistency of the results across the ISSP and WVS samples, dropping low-quality
series, and looking at harmonized U.S. inequalities should nevertheless instill con￿dence that the
￿ndings of this study are not the product of irregularities in the constructed series.2
4 U.S. Opinion Poll (GSS)
Social preferences for the United States are estimated from the General Social Survey (GSS),
which has been conducted on an annual or biennial basis since 1972 with sample sizes ranging
from 1400 to 3000 adults. This study focuses on a question that has been included for the full
term of the survey. The question gauges respondent attitudes towards spending more or less
money on welfare, while a similar question regarding spending for the space exploration program
is used for contrast:
Q. (Welfare Spending) "Are we spending too much money, too little money, or about




2Macroeconomic covariates are taken from the United Nations. The sector distribution covariates employ the
"Value added, national currency, constant prices, by industry groups (WB estimates) [code 29915]" series.
4A third question, included in most surveys since 1978, asks respondents to rate on a seven-
point scale how much the federal government should concern itself with the income di⁄erences
between the rich and poor (GSS Income Equalization). Seven is labeled, "The government ought
to reduce income di⁄erences between the rich and poor." One is labeled, "The government should
not concern itself with reducing income di⁄erences."
For both the Welfare Spending and GSS Income Equalization questions, alternative versions
are included in some years (e.g., substituting "assistance to the poor" for "welfare"). As the
mean responses shift signi￿cantly with these alternative word choices, these questions are not
incorporated; a visual check indicates trends for these alternative questions mirror those of the
main questions. It should also be noted that the Welfare Spending question references current
policies. Luttmer (2001) considers several corrections for this relative inquiry, ￿nding his results
using the base question alone are robust. This study does not attempt any such corrections.
Finally, respondents since 1972 are asked their political-party preference and the strength of
this association on a seven-point scale.
Q. (Party Identi￿cation) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a
Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"
1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican
3. Independent, close to Republican
4. Independent (Neither, No Response)
5. Independent, close to Democrat
6. Not very strong Democrat
7. Strong Democrat
5 U.S. Inequality Series
Table A2 provides the federal minimum wage ratios and expected regional coverage ratios used
to construct the minimum-wage instrument employed in the U.S. analysis. The last four columns
also document the log 80-20 income ratios employed in the primary estimations. The robustness
of the instrument design has been veri￿ed on several dimensions. First, the results are mostly
robust to simply ￿xing the coverage rate at its 1970 level for each region; the only trouble spot
is in regressions that contain only year and region ￿xed e⁄ects, as the simpler interaction cap-
tures some of the median-income level trend when it is excluded. Second, the total industrial
composition of the region can be substituted for the industrial composition of the poor workers.
Finally, as noted above, the instrument incorporates two aggregate trends￿ changes in the fed-
eral rate and changes in industry coverage rates. Close observation shows the instrument can
work against itself. Focusing on movements in the minimum-wage level, the instrument correctly
predicts regions with higher coverage levels will be more a⁄ected by federal changes. Yet, over
5a short horizon and holding the minimum wage ￿xed, the instrument incorrectly predicts an
increase in the coverage rate will raise inequality if the real federal rate is below its 1970 level;
its predicted direction is correct if the real federal rate is above its 1970 level. An alternative
speci￿cation removes the competing e⁄ects by using two instruments, one interacting the dy-
namics of the federal rate with ￿xed 1970 coverage rates and the second interacting industry
coverage rate trends with the 1970 industrial composition. The results are again very close to
those presented in the main text.
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7Country 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ARG 37.0 43.1 44.1 43.6 43.8 46.3 45.8 44.8 46.7
AUS 28.1 29.2 30.4 31.1 32.0 31.5 30.9 32.2
AUT 21.8 21.8 21.8 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.3 22.7 22.7 22.7 22.7 23.1 28.0 27.7 26.6 24.3
BEL 22.7 23.2 22.4 25.0
BGR 24.3 31.1 31.9 35.6 37.2 34.8 34.6
BLR 23.0 28.0 26.0
BRA 55.3 56.2 55.5 56.7 55.9 57.0 58.6 59.5 58.3 58.1
CAN 28.2 27.6 27.8 28.6 28.3 28.2 28.3 28.1 27.9 27.7 27.7 28.1 27.8 28.1 27.7 28.0 29.0 29.5 29.6
CHE 30.9 30.7
CHL 56.1 55.1 54.7 54.9 54.8 55.5 55.2
CHN 38.2 38.0 39.3 38.9 39.7 40.6 41.8 43.1
CZE 20.4 21.2 21.4 25.8 26.0 28.2 25.4 25.9 25.8 25.7 27.0
DEU 25.4 25.0 26.0 25.2 26.0 26.3 26.4 27.4 27.5 27.3
DNK 25.4 23.6 26.3 25.7
ESP 34.5 32.4 37.1 34.6
EST 41.2 38.8 39.6 39.0 37.4 34.1
FIN 21.3 20.7 21.2 21.3 21.2 21.0 20.7 21.8 21.6 21.8 22.6 23.6
FRA 29.0 28.0 27.0 27.0
GBR 25.3 25.9 25.8 26.4 26.6 27.9 28.8 30.2 32.0 32.4 33.7 33.7 34.0 33.7 33.0 33.0 33.3 33.8 34.4 34.2
HUN 26.7 26.7 30.7 29.7 28.3 31.4 32.1 33.7 33.9 34.1
IND 33.4 35.6 35.6 35.6 34.0 35.5 34.5 33.4 35.4 36.1 36.1
IRL 36.0 35.2 35.3 36.4
ISR 30.0 30.8 30.5 33.6
Table A1: Gini CoefficientsCountry 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ITA 30.9 30.3 28.4 28.9 29.8 29.9 29.9 31.6 29.3 28.9 32.2 32.0 32.9 31.6
JAP 28.0 29.3 29.7 30.1
KOR 34.9 31.2 30.4 29.5 28.7 28.4 28.1 28.5 28.4 29.1 28.3 31.6 32.0 31.7
LTU 26.0 37.2 34.9 34.1 35.0
LVA 22.5 22.5 29.6 24.5 30.7 31.7 32.2
MEX 44.8 46.7 48.5 49.6 47.7 49.4
NGA 45.0 45.0 50.6
NLD 23.9 23.5 24.7 25.6 25.5 25.8 26.6 27.8 27.7 27.8 28.3 28.0
NOR 22.5 22.2 22.3 21.9 23.4 22.8 23.3 23.7 24.3 25.4 24.8 25.7 26.1
NZL 25.9 26.0 25.3 25.8 28.0 29.9 30.7 29.9 31.8 31.0 31.8 32.2 33.1
PHL 44.6 44.5 46.8 45.1 48.7 48.2
POL 27.7 28.1 27.6 28.6 26.5 27.4 36.2 37.3 36.9 37.8 39.0
ROM 22.6 35.2 35.8
RUS 26.5 28.5 26.5 28.9 39.8 40.9 38.1 37.5 37.5 37.9 39.4
SVK 18.1 17.8 18.0 18.6 19.7 20.8 20.0 24.8 23.4
SVN 19.0 20.1 22.7 22.6 25.0 22.0 23.4 24.0 25.0 24.9
SWE 19.7 21.8 22.1 22.3 23.7 22.9 23.4 26.2 23.3 24.3 26.2 25.4 26.7
TUR 43.6 41.5 40.0
USA 31.2 31.5 32.3 32.5 32.5 33.0 33.2 33.3 33.4 33.9 33.6 33.6 34.1 35.6 35.8 35.3 34.5 35.0 35.1
ZAF 63.0 59.0 57.8
Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)
Notes:  Table documents country-year gini observations used with ISSP and WVS estimations.  The target gini estimates are one-year lags from the survey date, although 
contemporaneous or two-year or three-year lags are accepted when necessary.  Survey responses are dropped if they do not meet these conditions.  Kerr (2005) provides 
greater details on these calculations.Country Sources
ARG (Argentina) WIID1 (5 NOOK)
AUS (Australia) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Statistics Australia (2002)
AUT (Austria) LIS, WIID1 (4), WIID2 (1)
BEL (Belgium) LIS
BGR (Bulgaria) WIID1 (1), World Bank
BLR (Belarus) WIID1 (5), WIID2 (2)
BRA (Brazil) WIID1 (1)
CAN (Canada) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, Rupnik et al. (2001)
CHE (Switzerland) LIS
CHL (Chile) WIID1 (1), WIID2 (2)
CHN (China) WIID1 (1)
CZE (Czech Rep.) LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1,2)
DEU (W. Germany) Frick and Grabka (2002), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
DNK (Denmark) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ESP (Spain) Fanjul and Renes (2002), LIS, WIID2 (1)
EST (Estonia) WIID1 (1)
FIN (Finland) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID1 (1)
FRA (France) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (2)
GBR (Great Britain) Goodman (2001), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000)
HUN (Hungary) LIS, WIID1 (1)
IND (India) WIID1 (3), WIID2 (2)
IRL (Ireland) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1), WIID2 (1)
ISR (Israel) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS
ITA (Italy) Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), WIID2 (1)
JAP (Japan) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Japan (2002)
KOR (South Korea) WIID1 (1), Statistics Korea (2002)
LTU (Lithuania) WIID1 (4), WIID2 (2)
LVA (Latvia) WIID1 (4)
MEX (Mexico) LIS
NGA (Nigeria) WIID1 (1)
NLD (Netherlands) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID2 (1)
NOR (Norway) Brandolini (1999), Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), Statistics Norway (2002), WIID1 (1)
NZL (New Zealand) Statistics New Zealand (1999)
PHL (Philippines) Statistics Philippines (2002)
POL (Poland) LIS, WIID1 (1)
ROM (Romania) WIID2 (2)
RUS (Russia) LIS, Ovtcharova (2001)
SVK (Slovakia) WIID1 (1)
SVN (Slovenia) LIS, WIID1 (1,4)
SWE (Sweden) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), LIS, WIID1 (1)
TUR (Turkey) WIID2 (3)
USA (United States) Gottschalk and Smeeding (2000), United States Census Bureau (2000)
ZAF (South Africa) WIID1 (1), WIID2 (3)
Table A1: Gini Coefficients (continued)Nominal Real Log Ratio
Year M. Wage M. Wage to 1970 Northeast Midwest South West Northeast Midwest South West
1970 1.60 5.03 0.00 89.9 87.1 78.4 87.2 0.500 0.487 0.638 0.527
1971 1.60 4.81 0.04 89.9 87.1 78.3 87.2 0.509 0.495 0.649 0.555
1972 1.60 4.59 0.09 89.9 87.1 78.3 87.2 0.525 0.515 0.635 0.557
1973 1.60 4.46 0.12 90.2 87.5 78.9 87.6 0.532 0.504 0.649 0.597
1974 2.00 5.25 -0.04 90.3 87.7 79.2 87.8 0.525 0.503 0.628 0.578
1975 2.10 5.01 0.00 90.4 87.8 79.3 87.9 0.540 0.503 0.632 0.572
1976 2.30 5.07 -0.01 90.5 87.9 79.6 88.0 0.554 0.523 0.633 0.592
1977 2.30 4.80 0.05 90.6 88.0 79.6 88.1 0.553 0.528 0.634 0.576
1978 2.65 5.20 -0.03 90.7 88.2 79.8 88.2 0.569 0.536 0.640 0.592
1979 2.90 5.45 -0.08 90.7 88.2 79.8 88.2 0.565 0.523 0.646 0.589
1980 3.10 5.33 -0.06 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.574 0.538 0.646 0.593
1981 3.35 5.18 -0.03 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.577 0.550 0.659 0.605
1982 3.35 4.74 0.06 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.581 0.567 0.678 0.627
1983 3.35 4.48 0.12 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.601 0.587 0.690 0.652
1984 3.35 4.30 0.16 90.8 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.630 0.608 0.692 0.662
1985 3.35 4.13 0.20 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.4 0.631 0.601 0.685 0.644
1986 3.35 4.00 0.23 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.633 0.612 0.690 0.662
1987 3.35 3.93 0.25 90.9 88.5 80.2 88.5 0.617 0.609 0.706 0.670
1988 3.35 3.80 0.28 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.5 0.618 0.626 0.713 0.667
1989 3.35 3.66 0.32 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.6 0.619 0.612 0.713 0.674
1990 3.80 3.99 0.23 90.9 88.5 80.3 88.6 0.640 0.607 0.699 0.673
1991 4.25 4.25 0.17 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.638 0.627 0.687 0.682
1992 4.25 4.10 0.20 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.5 0.650 0.628 0.697 0.698
1993 4.25 4.00 0.23 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.650 0.637 0.719 0.698
1994 4.25 3.90 0.25 90.9 88.4 80.1 88.5 0.666 0.652 0.726 0.722
1995 4.25 3.82 0.27 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.678 0.630 0.705 0.745
1996 4.75 4.17 0.19 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.675 0.616 0.698 0.733
1997 5.15 4.40 0.13 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.689 0.617 0.702 0.739
1998 5.15 4.31 0.15 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.698 0.610 0.706 0.723
1999 5.15 4.25 0.17 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.702 0.621 0.702 0.731
2000 5.15 4.16 0.19 90.9 88.4 80.2 88.5 0.696 0.623 0.693 0.721
Table A2: Minimum-Wage Instrument Descriptive Statistics
Expected Coverage Ratios Log 80-20 Family Disposable Income